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At first Husserl conceived phenomenology as descriptive psychology and then as 
transcendental philosophy. With the second conception, announced publicly in 
his lectures of 1907, phenomenology was presented as co-ordinate with what he 
often called “reduction” or even “the reduction.”1 Whether there is just the one 
reduction or several, whether there is an order of them that must be respected (the 
usual sequence being phenomenological, transcendental and eidetic), how they 
hang together (if they do), and whether his understanding of reduction is circular, 
are pressing questions that emerge over the course of Husserl’s writing life. They 
are sometimes accompanied by skeptical questions whether some reductions—
the inter-subjective, for instance—are no more than promissory notes, whether 
reduction presumes a sort of Cartesian dualism, and even whether phenomenology 
really needs reduction of any kind in the first place. In addition, one might inquire 
whether other styles of philosophizing, including philosophizing undertaken in 
earlier periods and in other cultures, perform reduction of some sort, even if it 
is not asterisked for attention in their vocabularies; and, further, one might ask 
if reduction occurs in other practices: contemplative prayer and meditation, the 
production of art, and the writing of theology, for instance. 
All these are questions I have considered elsewhere, and I shall not discuss them 
in any detail in this paper. Instead, I shall approach reduction from behind, as it 
were, and ask a question that Husserl does not himself pose. What is irreducible? 
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That is: what, in Husserl’s philosophical world, allows no purchase for reduction? 
That question may be answered by close reference to his writings from The Idea 
of Phenomenology (1907) to The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology (1938), but the response it elicits is not simply exegetical: it concerns 
the scope, the direction, the nature, and indeed the proper sphere or spheres in 
which reduction might be performed.2 The question can certainly be answered, 
but the more interesting questions hide just behind it: What resists reduction 
almost completely, and why? In answering these questions I set aside reservations 
made by realist phenomenologists—Roman Ingarden, in particular—as to 
whether reduction, regarded as a methodological precaution for epistemological 
investigations, can have any purchase on ontology.3 I remain solely with Husserl 
here, although I note at the outset that answering the questions I have posed 
touches on the very possibility of phenomenology in the Husserlian style. 
Reflection on Husserl’s insistence on the need for reduction has had five main 
phases. To begin with, there is considerable perplexity and even defiance with 
respect to the idea by members of the Göttingen Philosophical Society—Roman 
Ingarden and Hedwig Conrad-Martinus, among others—for whom reduction marks 
a decisive reorientation of phenomenology. It is not a productive reorientation 
in their view, for it truncates the project of a thoroughgoing anti-psychologist 
realism, as started in the Logical Investigations (1900-01) and, worse (they think), 
it opens a slippery trail back to the subjective idealism of Fichte and the young 
Schelling. This first phase is doubtless the most important for Husserl himself, 
since it prompted him to clarify the direction, extent and nature of reduction, 
which, in turn, led him to devise increasingly exacting accounts of it. His lectures 
on the theory of reduction in 1923 and 1924 are exemplary in this regard.4 Yet 
at the same time those lectures were being delivered other reservations about 
reduction were perhaps already being pondered. 
Could reduction be rethought so that phenomenology may be situated on firmer 
ground? The young Martin Heidegger perhaps believed it could when in the Summer 
of 1927 he said that, for him, reduction was a leading back from beings to being; 
but we need to take this re-formulation with a pinch of salt, for while Heidegger 
felt it essential to master Husserlian phenomenology he had little interest in the 
transcendental.5 It is not even right to see the “Da” of “Dasein” marking place 
as a condition for human being. For Heidegger, it indicates “the openness where 
beings can be present for the human being, and the human being also for himself” 
and of course Heidegger does not appeal in the slightest to mental conditions.6 
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His formulation of reduction is perhaps more prudential than methodological. 
What chiefly interests the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit (1927) and thereabouts is 
a way out of Cartesianism and Neo-Kantianism, and any hint of methodological 
primacy of a mental operation resulting in a pure philosophical gaze brings less 
his suspicion than his rejection.7 He is not invested in an epistemic distinction 
between subject and object, and is certainly no advocate of θεωρία as a model of 
human interaction with the world. His interest is in In-der-Welt-sein, and θεωρεῖν 
features only in terms of looking out on the world.8 “Reduction,” as the young 
Heidegger practices it, turns not on mental abstention from positing in order to 
survey the processes of constitution as much as Stimmung: a mood “comes over” 
one, and leads one from beings to being. Later, in his own way, he will rethink 
reduction more thoroughly, as a “step back” [Schritt-zurück] from the ontic to the 
ontological or as a meditation [Besinnung] into the truth of beyng, das Seyn rather 
than das Sein des Seinden.9 And finally, he will speak of releasement rather than 
reduction.10 Long before he gets to that stage, he will have given up all pretense 
of keeping faith with Husserl’s methods and vocabulary. He will have passed from 
what we might broadly call contemplation of phenomena to meditation on being: 
it is a passage between two great philosophers in which more than one thing goes 
back and forth. 
Perhaps the most disturbing reformulation of reduction, however, comes from 
Eugen Fink in his Sixth Cartesian Meditation (1932); and some of its force derives 
precisely from his careful attention to Being and Time (1927) and to the young 
Heidegger’s lectures, which he began hearing in 1928. Fink was especially taken by 
Heidegger’s reflections on Befindlichkeit. The “natural attitude,” for Fink, passes 
from a mode of mental ἄσκησις to Weltbefangenheit, a captivation of, by and for 
the world. Fink’s animating question is “not only how phenomenologizing comes 
about as the performance of the reduction but why it takes place at all.”11 Although 
Fink saw himself as pursuing a phenomenology of reduction, and so performing 
phenomenology to the second degree, the question is in truth more classically 
philosophical than phenomenological. The “how” is followed by a “why.” There 
is always a Hegel behind Husserl in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, for Fink 
believed that epistemological idealism anticipates the transcendental idealism 
of phenomenology, and indeed he figures his study as “an anticipatory look at a 
meontic philosophy of absolute spirit.”12 In any case, his basic question raises the 
uneasy issue of whether reduction, as Husserl practices it, presumes itself, and 
whether the philosopher is therefore guilty of circular reasoning. 
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To forestall this criticism, Fink attempts to refigure reduction; and he does so with 
great finesse. He distinguishes the three “I”’s involved in reduction: the human 
“I,” which continues to believe in the world as pre-given, the transcendental-
constituting “I,” which allows the constitution of the world to be viewed, and 
the “I” of the phenomenological onlooker, who “has never lived in belief in the 
world to begin with,” and who performs “the universal epoche” (42). As Fink 
says later, “it is not properly man who performs the reduction” (121); and the 
very performance of reduction signifies “the un-humanizing of man” (120). At 
risk in this understanding of reduction is whether phenomenology opens higher 
human possibilities, as Husserl believed it does, or whether it quietly affirms a 
philosophical interpretation of Gnosticism, the belief in an uncreated life hidden 
beneath created consciousness.13 A philosophical Gnosticism, as endorsed by Fink, 
would be the belief in a purely transcendental consciousness behind an empirical 
one, whereas Husserl affirms merely a transcendental aspect to an empirical 
consciousness. That said, it must be acknowledged that Fink’s radical proposal 
prompted some of Husserl’s most clarifying comments on ἐποχή and reduction.14 
In particular, it is salutary to hear that the phenomenological onlooker is not 
entirely distinct from the empirical “I” or the constituting “I” but is gradually 
“freed” by the actions of an ἐποχή and reduction.15
Doubtless influenced by his conversations with Fink at Louvain in 1939, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty sought to refigure reduction; but he certainly did not adopt Fink’s 
way of doing so, and, we might say, held back from experiencing “the awful 
tremor” of fully passing through it.16 Reduction, for him, was to be partial so 
that phenomenology did not leak into the broad river of modern idealism, the 
base flow of which begins with Kant.17 Paul Ricœur and Jacques Derrida followed 
his lead, though in their own ways and to different ends.18 Derrida, in particular, 
drew deeply from Fink, and the German’s appeal to the pre-existent constitution 
[“vor-seienden” Konstitution] of the phenomenological observer was cleansed of 
associations with epistemological idealism and combined with Jean Hyppolite’s 
suggestion that Husserlian consciousness might very well be understood as “a 
subjectless transcendental field.” 19 The younger Frenchman took both ideas and 
put them in a new setting. The role of pre-existent constitution is detached from 
consciousness and even from structure, as urged in structural linguistics, and 
becomes la différance. There is no deconstruction without reduction, which is not 
to say that reduction appears as a theme in deconstruction. Indeed, unless one 
looks very closely it does not appear to be marked at all.20 
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More generally, we might say that in French philosophy after the war there 
was always something that would resist bringing phenomena back to the pure 
immanence of absolute consciousness: a commitment to Gestalt psychology, an 
endorsement of hermeneutics, or an insistence on material inscription. All were 
motivated by a fear that thoroughgoing reduction of a mentalist kind, especially 
transcendental reduction, would animate an idealism that was better kept locked 
in the past of Königsberg, Jena or Berlin, or, closer to home, in uneasy memories 
of lectures by Léon Brunschvicg. Only with some philosophers associated with the 
“new phenomenology” has reduction been endorsed as something that needs to 
be undertaken as thoroughly as possible. (I emphasize some, not all: one does not 
look for reduction in Michel Henry or, among our contemporaries, in Jean-Louis 
Chrétien or Claude Romano.) Jean-Luc Marion, casting Heidegger’s prudential 
reformulation as a second reduction, proposes a “third reduction” that itself 
derives from Heidegger’s reflections on attunement in his 1928 lectures; and in the 
end reduction will lead us past being and past beyng to givenness [Gegebenheit].21 
Marion’s reduction is as radical as Fink’s, although it goes in precisely the opposite 
direction; rather than seek a transcendental consciousness distinct from its 
empirical counterpart, he looks to the self-giving of the phenomenon itself. Or, if 
you like, the two reductions contest Husserl’s view that phenomenality seems to be 
hybrid, divided between transcendental consciousness and the phenomenon, and 
distribute it in extreme ways: the one ascribes it to a transcendental consciousness 
distinct from empirical consciousness, and the other to the phenomenon itself.22 
Not all contemporary revisions of reduction, however radical, go quite so far: 
indeed, one of them shows that rather than phenomenology having no limits at 
all it encounters a limit precisely by performing a new reduction. Such is Jean-
Yves Lacoste’s “liturgical reduction,” which seeks to show that phenomenology 
cannot get to the bottom of what we mean by “human,” especially not if we 
understand the human state of living coram deo to be an essential determinant of 
being human.23  
Of course, it may well be doubted if Husserl, even after 1907, thought that all he 
did as a philosopher might properly be classed as “phenomenology.” Anyone who 
reads his collected writings will come across extended passages of epistemology, 
ethics, logic, and ontology.24 To be sure, these reflections on what we might call 
general philosophy are not simply contributions to it; they are inflected towards 
phenomenology. Husserl’s logic, for instance, is forever seeking transcendental 
grounds, and phenomenology in its genetic strain makes itself more and more 
felt, and is followed, finally, by generative phenomenology as sketched in the 
22 · kevin hart  
Crisis. That said, no one could plausibly interpret Husserl’s speculations on 
the all-encompassing monad, for example, as anything other than speculative 
metaphysics, even metaphysics prompted by theological ambitions.25 Certainly 
anything that must be construed to be “irreducible” must belong to general 
philosophy, if it is to belong to philosophy at all, and not phenomenology. But 
what does Husserl acknowledge as irreducible?
P
There are just three candidates for being irreducible —absolute consciousness, 
God, and natural language—although only the first attracts Husserl’s sustained 
interest because it is essential for the project of phenomenology. Reduction, we are 
told in The Idea of Phenomenology (1907), means “the exclusion of the transcendent 
as such as something to be accepted as existent, i.e., everything that is not evident 
givenness in its true sense, that is not absolutely given to pure ‘seeing’” (7). Indeed, 
“Our phenomenological sphere, the sphere of absolute clarity, of immanence in 
the true sense, reaches no farther than self-givenness reaches” (10). Now by the 
time we reach Ideas I (1913) we find a full account of reductions (§§ 56-62), which 
Husserl prepares for in his investigation of consciousness. In § 42, for instance, 
we find him placing an emphasis less on “evident givenness” and “self-givenness” 
than on two kinds of being, consciousness and reality, which are marked by “an 
essentially fundamental difference between the corresponding kind of givenness” (90). 
Both mental processes and spatio-temporal objects are subject to intentionality. 
Yet only the former can be perceived immanently, without adumbration, and so 
are entirely evident in their givenness. Spatio-temporal objects are transcendent, 
on the other hand, and their mode of givenness is co-ordinate with adumbration: 
they are given as oriented with respect to transcendental consciousness in one 
way or another, and consequently they can be oriented in many other ways, each 
of which has to be taken into account in an exercise of pure “seeing.” Physical 
objects are “merely phenomenal” in their being, Husserl insists in § 44, while a 
mental process is immanent and therefore absolute. An adequate grasp of it does 
not call for infinite reflection.  
Although phenomenological reduction leads a transcendent object back to the 
immanence of consciousness, it cannot change the status of the object’s being: it 
remains “real” rather than “absolute.” Nowhere can we see this more clearly than 
in Ideas I § 49 when Husserl adapts a well-known principle set out by Descartes. 
Husserl is seeking to show that ἐποχή and reduction combine to yield “the 
annihilation of the world” and that what remains is “absolute consciousness.” He 
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distinguishes absolute being from real being in two short italicized paragraphs:
Immanental being is therefore indubitably absolute being in the sense 
that by essential necessity immanental being nulla “re” indiget ad 
existendum.
In contradistinction, the world of transcendent “res” is entirely referred 
to consciousness and, more particularly, not to some logically conceived 
consciousness but to actual consciousness. (110)
Descartes writes in the Principia Philosophiæ (1644), “Per substantiam nihil aliud 
intelligere possumus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum” 
[By substance we can understand something which exists so that it does not 
require something else in order to exist].26 Absolute being is nothing like Cartesian 
substance—such is the point of Husserl’s scare quotes around “re” and “res”—
apart from the claim that it subsists entirely in itself, while real being, which is 
transcendent, depends wholly on absolute being. Unless one states this distinction 
with great care, and glosses “depends” in an appropriate manner, it will appear 
to commit its author to subjective idealism. So it is important to see that the 
distinction turns on phenomenality, not existence. Without absolute being, no 
entity can manifest itself; and, by the same token, absolute being requires entities 
in order to lay claim to being, which consists entirely in its power to render things 
manifest. 
Once this distinction is firmly established it makes no sense at all to suggest that 
consciousness—at least in its constitutive role—could be reduced. It is irreducible 
precisely in that it is the condition of possibility for transcendent entities to be 
reduced to pure immanence. One cannot reach this level of clarity, however, 
without encountering an oddity. Phenomenality, for Husserl, seems to enjoy what 
I have already called a hybrid state; it is shared between an entity (insofar as it 
can be a phenomenon) and what allows it to be led back to immanence. Yet this 
sharing, if it is indeed that, is not at all equal. As Husserl puts it, “phenomenality, 
as a characteristic that specifically belongs to appearing and to the thing that appears, 
would, if understood in the broadened sense of the term, be the fundamental 
characteristic of the mental” [my emphasis].27 I take it that the term in question 
is “mental” and that the broadening is the addition of the transcendental aspect 
of consciousness to empirical consciousness. To say that phenomenality is the 
“fundamental characteristic of the mental” is to distance oneself from Brentano’s 
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well-known remark about intentionality being the mark of the mental; and it 
is also to step back from any claim about the primacy of intentionality, even in 
Husserl’s sense.28 By the same token, it is not to endorse intuition as basic to 
phenomenology. Rather, transcendental consciousness is characterized, first and 
foremost, by way of phenomenality. The ability of an entity to manifest itself is, 
counter-intuitively, assigned primarily to that to which it manifests itself. 
The phenomenon’s capacity to manifest itself, as Husserl understands it, is 
therefore alienated from itself. This would be the case in all respects: perception, to 
be sure, but also anticipation, recollection, imagination, and so on. Phenomenality 
would be in the phenomenon, we might say, but only if we are careful to specify its 
mode of inherence: as a term “in” a relationship, and one that has been initiated 
by transcendental consciousness. The “essence of a phenomenon” is, it seems, 
to be found by way of an asymmetric relation of an intending consciousness with 
what has become a phenomenon. A clarification is immediately required, for the 
essence in question is not the noema, the intentional content of an experience, 
but the capacity that underlines the possibility of noetic-noematic correlation 
and that, if we follow Husserl to the letter, seems to be shared between the two, 
though only because of the ability of absolute being to capture real being through 
the structure of intentionality and the power of acts of intuition. 
At this point a number of fundamental problems begin to impinge on the inquiry. 
I have already noted that one can eliminate some of these problems by declining 
to regard phenomenality as a relation. If we do that, we find Michel Henry on one 
side of a divide: phenomenality is primary, definitive of “life” itself. And we see 
Marion on the other side: phenomenality belongs by right to the phenomenon, 
and so intentional horizons are vulnerable to being breached, and a new class 
of phenomena, those saturated by intuition, comes into view. But providing a 
history of philosophy never serves well as a solution to philosophical problems; 
it simply generates problems of its own. In the case of this division there would 
be two main difficulties. With Henry there is the problem of establishing that 
the intentional actually derives from the non-intentional and, if it does, showing 
in what way or ways a consideration of the non-intentional can be of sustaining 
interest for a subject.29 And with Marion the quandary is in finding that the cost of 
enjoying saturation to the first or second degree is accepting the stripped down 
version of the self that is called l’adonné, the one born to the gift. It may well be that 
intuition rather than intentionality is the driving force of phenomenology as it was 
conceived, yet intuitions for Husserl are acts that rely on consciousness in order 
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to be performed; and, at first, l’adonné seems strangely bereft of consciousness, 
always an infant, as it were. Of course, an account of adult consciousness can be 
given, but it requires more of a finely grained genetic explanation than is readily 
found in Marion’s writings in and around Étant donné (1997). 
Yet phenomenality, for Husserl, cannot be a relation between two terms that 
pre-exist it. For transcendental consciousness enables an entity to become a 
phenomenon. I think it would be a mistake to take Husserl overly literally and 
to assert a mental quality, phenomenality, which subtends intentionality and 
intuition. Phenomenality is indeed shared but not between phenomenon and 
consciousness; it is a name we can give to the combined operations of intentionality 
and intuition. The power of that combination is restricted to certain sorts of entity, 
namely those we can intuit and of which we can be conscious.  We might say that 
some of these entities are amenable to reduction while, in principle, others do not 
require it in the first place. Let us consider the second case first. If we remain with 
Husserl, we have to say that mental processes are one with their phenomenality. 
To think a real number— say, 2—or to perform a basic arithmetical operation 
with regards to it (say 2 + 3 = 5) is utterly to exhaust its phenomenality. There is 
nothing other than cognition at issue. Yet when I perceive, remember, anticipate 
or even imagine two pears, their phenomenality falls outside the immanence of 
consciousness, such that I am in principle required to embark on an infinite task 
of description, even though I may have very high levels of Evidenz at my disposal 
with respect to the pears if I can perceive them with more than one sense. The 
number 2, as I apprehend it in consciousness, does not need to be reduced; it does 
not give itself to me in any orientation with regard to consciousness at all. Yet the 
two pears make endless demands upon me because I can see them from different 
perspectives. 
If Husserl tells us, time and again, about this, it is nonetheless to the painters, 
photographers, sculptors and poets that we must go for concrete testimony. Often 
when literature is at issue we are directed (and, first of all, by Henri Maldiney) to 
Francis Ponge, to elaborate texts such as “Le Verre d’Eau” or “Le Savon,” and with 
good reason.30 Here, though, I would like to cite Wallace Stevens’ poem, “Study 
of Two Pears”:
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I 
Opusculum paedagogum.
The pears are not viols,
Nudes or bottles.
They resemble nothing else.
II
They are yellow forms
Composed of curves
Bulging toward the base.
They are touched red.
III
They are not flat surfaces
Having curved outlines.
They are round
Tapering toward the top.
IV
In the way they are modelled
There are bits of blue.




It glistens with various yellows,
Citrons, oranges and greens
Flowering over the skin.
VI
The shadows of the pears
Are blobs on the green cloth.
The pears are not seen
As the observer wills.31
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The poem is indeed a little lesson on how to see—color, shape, texture, surface 
sheen, and so on—and the first class we take with Husserl often consists of no 
more than this. We are to look at a phenomenon just as it appears and we can best 
do that by referring to exactly how it is intended and how it attracts our attention: 
“an Ego-ray, launched from the pure Ego, goes out toward the Object, and, as 
it were, counter-rays issue from the Object and come back to the Ego.”32 (The 
“pure Ego,” note; we are not talking about ordinary acts of vision and certainly 
not solely about volition but about intentional acts, and hence of objects given 
just as intended.) As he says, each phenomenon addresses us, saying “Ich bin da!”; 
it “calls out to us,” saying, “There is still more to see here, turn me so you can see 
all my sides, let your gaze run through me, draw closer to me, open me up, divide 
me up; keep on looking me over again and again, turning me to see all sides. You 
will get to know me like this, all that I am, all my surface qualities, all my inner 
sensible qualities.”33 Stevens ends his poem after six stanzas; yet the great prose 
poem of phenomenology, even if restricted to two pears, would never end. (Long 
after they have rotted, one can reflect upon the noema of the pears.) In principle, 
reduction is infinite; transcendence can never fully be brought into immanence, 
for the intentional correlation between acts and their objects keeps shifting. 
Once the distinction between absolute and real being is accepted, it is impossible 
even to conceive the idea of reducing transcendental consciousness. Not that this 
impossibility prevents one from fantasizing about such a thing. Maurice Blanchot 
does something like that in Thomas l’obscur (1941; 1950), although, to be sure, 
he has already adjusted the nature of consciousness. Thomas encounters “night 
itself,” and sees both its void and what enables this sight to occur. “Not only did 
this eye which saw nothing apprehend something, it apprehended the cause of its 
vision. It saw as object that which prevented it from seeing.” So far this is relatively 
straightforward, if metaphysically challenging: Thomas can see “night itself.” Yet 
the narrator continues, “Its own glance entered into it as an image, just when 
this glance seemed [était considéré] the death of all image.”34 So Thomas sees 
his own act of seeing. It does not occur by way of a reference to anything outside 
him (by way of a mirror or a darkened window, for instance), and indeed he is 
passive with respect to it. It is at that very moment, however, that the “obscure 
Thomas,” who is real only under the sign of death and who gives his name to the 
roman and récit, enters the living Thomas. That this obscure Thomas is taken to be 
rich in phenomenality is one of the disconcerting themes of the récit: as Thomas 
says, he enters “into absolute dispute” with himself (97). For Husserl, too, the 
phenomenality in play in transcendental consciousness cannot itself appear 
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unless, of course, one says (against Kant) that the cognition of a number, such as 
2, is an appearance. 
What strikes the reader of Blanchot’s powerful récit as a reverie, one that when 
interpreted along philosophical lines, much as one finds in his essays, seems 
incredible to anyone convinced by Husserl’s program of phenomenology. Yet 
Blanchot remains at the limit of phenomenology, and proposes an “infinite 
reduction,” one that would allow the approach of the Outside.35 Husserl himself 
also considers an obscure companion deep within the self. This happens in his 
acknowledgment of God, and it is introduced in Ideas I § 51, seven paragraphs 
before the deity is formally excluded from phenomenology in § 58:
since a worldly God is evidently impossible and since, on the other 
hand, the immanence of God in absolute consciousness cannot be 
taken as immanence in the sense of being as a mental process (which 
would be no less counter-sensical), there must be, therefore, within 
the absolute stream of consciousness and its infinities, modes in 
which transcendencies are made known other than the constituting 
of physical realities as unities of harmonious appearances; and 
ultimately there would also have to be intuitional manifestations to 
which a theoretical thinking might conform, so that, by following 
them rationally, it might make intelligible the unitary rule of the 
supposed theological principle. (116-17)
The first thing to consider here is what Husserl means by “God.” We remember 
his discussion of pagan deities in the fifth of the Logical Investigations: “If I have an 
idea of the god Jupiter, this god is my presented object, he is ‘immanently present’ 
in my act, he has ‘mental inexistence’ in the latter, or whatever expression we 
may use to disguise our true meaning.” Yet, as Husserl makes very plain, “the god 
Jupiter naturally will not be found” in my intentional experience, for he “is in truth 
not really immanent or mental” and “does not exist at all.”36 By the same token, 
Husserl is not thinking of the Judeo-Christian deity, at least not of any personal 
God, and he has no recourse to Scripture or any testimony as regards positive 
revelation of any sort. Rather, God is for him a monad, “all-consciousness.”37
Absolute consciousness is irreducible because of its thoroughgoing immanence. 
The Judeo-Christian God as ecclesiastically conceived would be irreducible, for 
Husserl, because of the deity’s radical transcendence of individual consciousness. 
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I can attend to the sight of a jet in the air, the sound of a sonata, the taste of a ripe 
mango, the smell of Cavendish pipe tobacco, and the touch of a cat as she rubs 
herself against my leg first thing in the morning; but no matter how long or how 
intently I direct my gaze to the Judeo-Christian God, whether I regard him as 
ontic, ontological, as event or person, I cannot lead him back to the immanence of 
transcendental consciousness. I must wait for a theophany, revelation, “mystical 
experience,” or look to inner dwelling, since neither intentionality nor intuition 
seems to be of any help to me. Yet it does not follow from the nature of the divine 
transcendence that God does not manifest himself. The Judeo-Christian God is 
above and beyond genus, as Lateran IV says (Denz. 432). There is no contrast 
between Creation and God, for his otherness exceeds any distinction we might 
draw between “same” and “other.”38 There is therefore no contradiction for him in 
transcending Creation and in being immanent in it. So God can manifest himself 
in terms of absolute being, not a mental process (which would render human 
beings divine) but in quite other ways. There would be intuitions of the divine 
always and already in absolute being, and these acts would have to be recognized 
before one could engage in theoretical thinking about them.39 That is, Judeo-
Christian theology would turn on an acknowledgement of God as irreducible in 
his radical transcendence but not in his radical immanence, and a doctrine of God 
would have to disentangle the absolute character of immanent being from the 
absolute character of divine being. The same would be true, in quite another way, 
for phenomenology if it were to be pursued without reference to theology. 
If we ask ourselves what these “intuitional manifestations” of the divine are, we 
might answer by way of Anselm’s ontological argument in the Proslogion, or, closer 
to home for Husserl, Descartes’s version of the same thought experiment in the 
third of the Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). So we recall Descartes testifying, 
that “in some way I have in me the notion of the infinite earlier than the finite—
to wit, the notion of God before that of myself” [ac proinde priorem quodammodo 
in me esse perceptionem infiniti quam finiti, hoc est Dei quam mei ipsius] and we also 
recall his reflection on this claim: 
[W]hen I reflect on myself I not only know that I am something [imperfect], 
incomplete and dependent on another, which incessantly aspires after 
something which is better and greater than myself, but I also know that 
He on whom I depend possesses in Himself all the great things towards 
which I aspire [and the ideas of which I find within myself], and that not 
indefinitely or potentially alone, but really, actually and infinitely; and that 
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thus He is God [hoc est, dum in meipsum mentis aciem converto, non modo 
intelligo me esse rem incompletam & ab alio dependentem, remque ad majora & 
majora sive meliora indefinite aspirantem; sed simul etiam intelligo illum, a quo 
pendeo, majora ista omnia non indefinite & potentia tantum, sed reipsa infinite 
in se habere, atque ita Deum esse].40 
This notion of God goes back to St Gregory of Nyssa’s blind sighting of Eunomius, 
namely in arguing that the defining trait of God is the infinite (ἄπειρον), not 
the unbegotten, but it is Descartes’s view that we have intellectual intuition that 
the infinite precedes the finite.41 Later, of course, Michel Henry will contest that 
the intuition is intellectual at all; for him, it is an intuition of phenomenality, 
understood as a primal movement of life, namely, pathos and joy.42
Husserl implicitly draws from St Gregory of Nyssa in thinking of the deity as 
infinite, but it is not by way of event, as with Aquinas, or by way of substance, as 
with Descartes, but by way of infinite reason and, indeed, as a teleology directed 
to that reason. God, understood as “all-consciousness,” is the end point on which 
all human values finally converge. (The same thing is urged in the Kaizo essays.) 
So this is not “the infinite” in a positive sense but at best only in a regulative 
sense, kin to the Kantian Idea. “Naturally,” Husserl writes, “we extend the 
phenomenological reduction to include this ‘absolute’ and ‘transcendent’ being,” 
and then adds, “It shall remain excluded from the new field of research which is 
to be provided, since this shall be a field of pure consciousness.”43 Taken together, 
the two sentences seem more than a little peculiar. For how can one lead back to 
immanent consciousness that which transcends it so radically so as to evade any 
gaze, however well trained? One can bracket the deity as offering any explanation 
of phenomena, as part of the natural attitude (if the all-consciousness is conceived 
within the realm of the natural) or as part of what we might call the supernatural 
attitude (if the deity is imagined as supernatural). And perhaps there are ecclesial 
conceptions of the deity that are subject to reduction. (To go down that path is to 
encounter Rudolf Bultmann along the way.44) Yet we must be careful. The deity, as 
Husserl conceives him, would be always and already within consciousness but not 
as consciousness; and so there would be a mode of transcendence that in principle 
would be open to reduction. God’s transcendence, perhaps unlike Jupiter’s, would 
abide in my intentional experience, as modus sine modo (as Bernard of Clairvaux 
might say).45 We would not be able fully to lead the Judeo-Christian God back to 
pure immanence by dint of the radical nature of his transcendence (at the very 
least it would be an all-embracing inter-subjectivity), but we would be able to 
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conceive him as a teleological limit, and in that restricted sense the reduction 
would extend to him, in principle although not in fact. 
The third candidate for being irreducible is language, and Fink alerts us to 
the problem of language for Husserl more sharply than anyone else. The 
phenomenological onlooker, who has performed ἐποχή and reduction, must 
have recourse to language in order to express his or her cognitions. “He must 
take over from the constituting I the habituality of language and participate in the 
latter’s constitutive life, against his own wish to be non-participant. But this 
participation is merely apparent [scheinbare], inasmuch as in taking over language 
the phenomenologizing onlooker transforms its natural sense as referring to what 
is existent. If this kind of transformation did not occur, then the phenomenologist 
would slip out of the transcendental attitude with every word he spoke.”46 To which 
Husserl responds in a marginal annotation:  “I always speak natural language, 
but in a transcendentally altered sense.”47 What could this change possibly be? 
How would it be marked? A moment later, in another marginal annotation, we 
are given an answer: “A phenomenological language in principle only has sense, 
only has possibility, as transformed natural language, just as the transcendental 
phenomenon, world, only has sense as the transformed sense-of-being” (86 n. 
295).48 We are thus taken back to the Logical Investigations, and first of all to the 
warning in the “Prolegomenon,” that language “represents a most imperfect aid 
towards strict research. The pernicious influences of ambiguities on the validity 
of syllogistic inferences are familiar.”49 Then we recall Husserl’s early way of 
overcoming these “pernicious influences,” namely, by distinguishing expression 
from indication, and seeking a pure language of sense. We should also remember 
his stricture in Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929) that not all of one’s psychic 
life is actually expressed in language: intentions are directed through words, and 
are not in and of themselves part of language.50
Finally, we find a fuller answer in Husserl’s late essay “The Origin of Geometry” 
(1936), edited by Fink, where a distinction is drawn between writing that is Leib 
(constituting, giving sense) and writing that is Körper (constituted, factual); and 
it is the former that the geometer or philosopher writes: an embodiment of living 
truth (Verleibichung) rather than a material inscription (Verkörperung). Only logic, 
mathematics and rigorous philosophy—phenomenology—could be truly pure in 
the sense of being written in a thoroughly reduced language, Husserl thinks, a 
language in which materiality would not bother the reader because of the clarity 
of the author’s intentions as they are embodied in conventional signs, whether 
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logical, mathematical or linguistic. He is close to Frege here. Writing in a reduced 
language is straightforward in logic and mathematics, Husserl thinks, because their 
objects are free idealities and therefore above and beyond time and history. The 
scholar can, as it were, look straight through language to the objects that interest 
him or her. What, though, of philosophy? If its object is to analyze truths that are 
universal and invariant with respect to time, then it will address free idealities; 
but even the most exacting phenomenology, since it must concern itself also with 
the mundane, will frequently produce texts that address bound idealities, which 
belong to the cultural world, and even the most free of free idealities is bound to 
the extent that it is marked by Erstlichkeit, having been discovered at a time and 
in a place: we speak of Pythagoras’ Theorem, Newton’s Laws, Euler’s Theorem, 
Gauss equations, and so on.51 And then there are of course natural phenomena, 
which display their content to us by way of the irreality of noemata. As one passes 
from logic to nature to poetry the idea of a reduced language becomes less and 
less plausible.  
It may be that we should not expect the same degree of rigor in all cases of 
reduction, much as we do not expect the same degree of Evidenz to be available 
with all phenomena. If so, phenomenology, as Husserl practices it, has a varying 
limit. Of more concern, I think, is one’s conviction that phenomenology is 
valuable precisely because it leads us to a concrete understanding of phenomena, 
and that it is in art (including poetry) where we find such concreteness in an 
exemplary way. It is not language that is the problem of reduction here so much 
as what prompts reduction in the first place and indeed the very direction of 
reduction. Blanchot evokes this situation in his enigmatic remarks about “infinite 
reduction,” though for him language is regarded solely by way of its ability to 
hollow out lived experience and alert us to the approach of the Outside.52 It seems 
to me, though, that language need not evacuate phenomenality but rather focus 
it. Let me consider a fairly complex example, Wallace Stevens’ early lyric “Nomad 
Exquisite.” Part of the poem’s complexity abides in its rendering its condition of 
possibility as a theme. 
When I read the poem I am led back, through the very luxuriance of the language, 
to something that is prior to me and that lays a claim on me. Yet that is not quite 
how we first read the lyric:
the irreducible · 33 
As the immense dew of Florida
Brings forth
The big-finned palm
And green vine angering for life,
As the immense dew of Florida
Brings forth hymn and hymn
From the beholder,
Beholding all these green sides
And gold sides of green sides,
And blessed mornings,
Meet for the eye of the young alligator,
And lightning colors
So, in me, come flinging
Forms, flames, and the flakes of flames.53
When we first read this poem we encounter a lyric about the contemplative gaze 
of a “beholder” who grasps, from one bodily perspective, the essence of life in the 
Deep South. Yet the lyric gaze does not end in leading transcendence back to a 
final immanence; and in fact in its final line the poem passes from consciousness 
to imagination. The imagination reverses the movement from transcendence 
to immanence; it “flings” a response back into the world. The fecundity of the 
landscape prompts a reaction in the one beholding it; it elicits a storm of imaginative 
force, a desire to create (which ends with the spent energy of that desire), which 
is caught in the very lyric we have been reading. The poet sees the essence of 
tropical life, at least from one perspective, and supplements that perceptual act 
with an account of human creativity. It may be that the poem ultimately turns on 
the ambiguity of “tropical”: a climactic state and a figural situation. 
Were Stevens writing in a fully reduced language “Nomad Exquisite” would run 
more or less as follows: “Climactic conditions in the Deep South of North America 
produce luxuriant vegetation and support exotic aquatic life, the fecundity of 
which resembles the human impulse to create art, an impulse that is quickly 
exhausted and leaves the artist feeling desolate.” Now such a text, if recorded in 
a work of phenomenology, would indicate little or nothing of the concreteness of 
life in Florida. Yet when one reads “Nomad Exquisite” one is led back to something 
independent of one’s existence, something that precedes it, namely the force of 
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life itself; and one also senses a claim on oneself: to be answerable to that force, 
to be as creative in one’s response to life as is possible in the ways that are given 
to one.  It is the richness of the language of the poem that prompts reduction: not 
only particular phrasings, such as the evocation of “immense dew” and the “green 
vine angering for life” [my emphases], but also the phonic play of the lines, and 
the repetitions that bespeak the sunlit luxuriance of Florida. 
Something similar could be said of how religious texts have the ability to prompt 
reduction in those who read them. To evoke all too fleetingly an example I 
consider in detail elsewhere, when I hear one of the parables of Jesus I am led 
back, through the narrative, to the absolute claim that the Kingdom of God has 
on me.54 In neither case, however, is reduction a mental ἄσκησις. Rather, it is I 
who am reduced, led back, to what radically precedes me—the force of natural 
life or the Kingdom of God—and can recognize it in a pre-thetic manner, in all its 
concreteness. That is, the force of life or the Kingdom becomes thinkable by dint 
of the poem or the parable, regardless of whether it remains difficult, mysterious, 
enigmatic, or whatever. Not all poems, and not all parables (for there are many 
outside the Gospels) have the strength to prompt reduction; and we may well take 
reduction as an index of poetic or religious force.  In thinking of the irreducible, 
as it might be for Husserl, we come partly to understand what he means by 
“reduction” and partly to grasp why that very notion needs to be reconceived more 
thoroughly than has been done so far. It is not a matter of modifying reduction, 
or prematurely halting it, so as to stem a tide of idealism; nor is it a question of 
colonizing the meontic so as to save reduction from circularity. Instead, it is being 
led back into concreteness, with all its ambiguities and difficulties, being lead back 
so that, as Stevens says, we might “be / In the difficulty of what it is to be.”55
—University of Virginia and Australian Catholic University
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